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Trust Flexibility and the Role of Courts in
Limiting Property Forms
Carla Spivack*
I thank Professor Spitko and Jake Calvert for their thoughtful comments on my article. This exchange offers a great opportunity to have a
discussion of this timely and – in my opinion – urgent issue in the ACTEC Law Journal, the forum of the Estate Planning Bar.
I begin with an important point common to both responses: the
concern that my proposal threatens to eliminate the many advantages
arising from the flexibility of trusts.1 This point is well taken: As John
Langbein has observed, the common law’s future interests and powers
of appointment make the trust a supple and infinitely useful tool for
multi-generational wealth transfer and management.2 Both Professor
Spitko and Mr. Calvert urge me not to give this important advantage of
the trust short shrift: Professor Spitko urges me to consider whether
“subjecting equitable interests to the numerus clausus principle3 will impair the trust’s inherent flexibility and, therefore, its utility,”4 and Mr.
Calvert, in a similar vein, argues that flexibility is “absolutely essential
to the purpose of trusts,” and that limiting that flexibility would impair
their usefulness.5 I agree that the unique flexibility of trusts offers many
advantages for those wishing to manage assets beyond their lifetimes.
Nor do I wish to eliminate this flexibility; rather, I suggest that whatever
options the trust offers should be ones which embody a democratic consensus about what property forms we as a society wish to endorse. I
* Carla Spivack is Professor of Law and Director of the Estate Planning Certificate
at Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1 Gary E. Spitko, “Undemocratic” Trusts and the Numerus Clausus Principle, 43
ACTEC L.J. 325 (2018); Jake Calvert, A Response to Democracy and Trusts, 43 ACTEC
L.J. 319 (2018).
2 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 671 (1995).
3 Mr. Calvert asserts that the numerus clausus principle “has never been explicitly
embraced by US law.” Calvert, supra note 1, at 320. While it is not usually explicit, it is
nonetheless foundational: every first year law student learns that there are four types of
leaseholds, and that one that fails to conform to the categories will be squeezed into a
suitable box if it comes to a court. Some casebooks, however, do make it explicit. See,
e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
778-79 (6th ed. 2014).
4 Spitko, supra note 1, at 327.
5 Calvert, supra note 1, at 322.
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argue that some current forms of the trust have far exceeded what democratic decision making should – or would – produce. In this respect, I
do contend that the flexibility of the trust has gone too far, and that
limiting some of the more extreme forms of this flexibility would be
socially beneficial without significantly hampering wealth transmission
and management.
For example, democratic decision making might very well result in
a broad based understanding that spendthrift trusts are a socially desirable form of protection for the vulnerable or the mentally disabled –
while rejecting the idea that merely putting a clause into a trust should
serve to insulate from creditors anyone who could afford the proper
drafting. Moreover, powers of appointment, one of the most flexible
features of the trust, seem fairly inoffensive to democratic property principles. In other cases, however, the trust’s much vaunted flexibility has
swallowed up the trust form itself: the self-settled asset protection trust
technically does not even comply with traditional trust doctrine, which
allows the donor to shield assets from the donee’s creditors, but not
from her own.6 These trusts allow the settlor to shield her assets from
creditors while retaining the ability to enjoy them herself.7 In reality,
then, APTs simply use the trust moniker to allow the wealthy to shield
assets from tort victims, creditors and taxes. This is what I mean when I
say that the trust’s flexibility has swallowed the trust form itself.
Mr. Calvert goes further in his criticism: he sees trust flexibility as
an embodiment of the American ideal of a free society and – if I understand correctly – of the constituent right to freely dispose of one’s property. I agree that the freedom to use, manage, and control one’s
property is one of the hallmarks of a free society. As every first year
property student learns, however, each right one person has over her
property limits another one’s rights over his; in the Hohfeldian language
I use in the article,8 every right gives rise to a corresponding no-right on
the part of someone else. Thus, in a truly free society, there must be a
balance among the rights of property owners to ensure that all have
reasonable freedom to deal with their property. The analogy to real
property I make in the article may be helpful here: the right to exclude
is limited by the other’s right of access; the right to free use of land is
limited by the neighbor’s right of quiet enjoyment, the owner’s right to
dispel surface water from his land is limited by the neighbor’s right to be
6

JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 557 (7th ed. 2005).
Eric Boughman, Practical Considerations For Using Self-Settled Trusts, FORBES,
Feb. 9, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeslegalcouncil/2017/02/09/practical-considerations-for-using-self-settled-trusts/#2dffdf8e2844 (noting that, in jurisdictions that allow
DAPTs, “the grantor may ‘have his cake (protection) and eat it (the assets) too.’“).
8 Carla Spivack, Democracy and Trusts, 42 ACTEC L.J. 311, 324-25 (2017).
7
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free of flooding, etc.9 It is my argument that the new breed of trusts
violates this balancing of rights among property owners, and that they
would not pass muster in a process involving all segments of society aiming to control the proliferation of property forms.
This point brings me to another issue Mr. Calvert raises: he questions the claim that dynasty trusts and APTs are often the result of legislative capture by special interest groups with little input from other
segments of society, and states that this assertion is “largely unsupported” in the text.10 I find this objection puzzling, as I offer numerous
examples and citations to support this not very controversial claim, including the definitive study by Sitkoff and Schanzenbach on the
subject.11
Indeed, it is because of the level of capture in the legislative process
surrounding this type of legislation that I support the intervention of
courts.12 Both responders, however, raise the very important concern
that, in Professor Spitko’s words, the judicial intervention I advocate is
“deeply undemocratic.” Secondarily, Professor Spitko suggests that that
courts are as subject to the influence of “moneyed interests” as legislatures. First, it’s worth noting that I advocate for judicial intervention
only in cases of the extreme failure of legislatures as democratic bodies,
which I argue is present in this particular arena.13 More importantly,
however, I want to argue that courts have a legitimate role to play in
policing property forms in these extreme situations, and that it is not
one inconsistent with democracy.
In the case of interest group capture, as Avihay Dorfman argues,
courts may intervene in the service of democracy.14 This may sound
paradoxical, but, in Dorfman’s words, courts may “supplement democracy” in these instances by “removing entrenched obstacles to deliberation [and] forcing the legislature to open up to the demands of the
public.”15 When certain groups are excluded from legislative decision
making, “the courts have a role to play because the self-correcting
properties of democratic politics [have been] nullified, and only the
9

These examples are taken from SINGER ET AL., supra note 3, at 333-94.
Calvert, supra note 1, at 321.
11 Spivack, supra note 8, at 331.
12 I disagree with Merrill and Smith’s conclusion, cited by Professor Spitko, that
“rent-seeking is [***] less likely in the context of decisions about property forms than in
other areas.” Spitko, supra note 1, at 328. As I explain in the article, the arcane and
“unsexy” nature of such decisions actually makes them of less interest to the public, and
therefore more susceptible to rent-seeking. Spivack, supra note 8, at 336.
13 Spivack, supra note 8, 331.
14 Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus
Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 503-07 (2011).
15 Id. at 513.
10
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courts can make the democratic process work as it should.”16 This was
originally a justification for some judicial decisions on civil rights, but
also serves as a justification for the courts’ role in supplementing democracy in property law today. By definition, two sides will be present in
judicial deliberation; this is often not the case in legislative decision
making about new trust forms, which, as Sitkoff and Schanzenbach,
Madoff, and others have shown, is dominated by special interest groups
and largely invisible to other sectors of the public.
Cases challenging forms of the trust might come about in a variety
of ways. As I note in the article, bankruptcy courts have already begun
invalidating transfers to APTs under Bankruptcy Code section 548(e).17
Further, courts in states which have passed these trusts can declare some
of their provisions invalid for public policy reasons: in Bacardi v.
White,18 for example, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that an exspouse with a support order could reach assets the husband held in a
spendthrift trust, concluding that “Florida’s interest in the enforcement
of [spousal support] awards under certain limited circumstances” outweighs “the declared intention of the settlor and the restraint of a
spendthrift trust,”19 despite the fact that these trusts were codified by
the legislature and recognized under Florida law. Other courts have followed similar reasoning. In effect, these courts are invalidating a property form – the right to maintain assets immune to spousal support
claims – by bringing an opposing interest group – those dependent on
support orders – into the process of deliberation. This is a necessary
corrective to a one-sided process in the service of the democratic creation of property rights. This is not to say that courts should invalidate
property forms due to a lack of democratic decision making20 – surely a
quagmire for a court to enter – but because a particular expansion of
numerus clausus categories was against public policy. A numerus
clausus-based analysis would lend doctrinal teeth to judicial decision
making about trust forms.
It’s certainly likely that, as Professor Spitko suggests, “the same
moneyed interests that have sought to influence the legislative process
to advance their private interests would seek to exert similar influence
over the judicial process were courts to apply the numerus clausus prin16

David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete? 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1258

(2010).
17 Spivack, supra note 8, at 337. These cases undermine Professor Spitko’s claim that
my proposal would lead to uncertainty in trust law; it is actually these trusts themselves
which are creating uncertainty in the law.
18 463 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
19 Id. at 222.
20 Spitko, supra note 1, at 330.
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ciple [ ].”21 This is of particular concern in the twenty-one states that
elect judges outright.22 I don’t wish to minimize this issue; judicial capture is a serious matter, and not just in this one area of law. I would
argue, however, that there is cause for some faith in independent judicial thinking. First, the judicial process, as I noted earlier, gives voice to
both sides, which the legislative process in this case often does not.
Judges must hear opposing views from groups disadvantaged by certain
forms of property – like spouses and children with support orders.
Second, the nature of judging is to rise above the mere imposition
of subjective preferences and prejudices. No matter how vehemently
parties advocate their positions, ultimately they must articulate the logic
and goals animating the law, and judges must base their decisions on the
same grounds. Certainly, our system may produce judges who rule in
the interests of groups they feel beholden to, but the public role of the
judiciary, legal training, and the adversarial nature of the proceedings,
all make this outcome less likely. I don’t disagree with Professor
Spitko’s conclusion that the debate about trusts optimally “would be
better focused on the legislature.”23 I simply do not believe, given the
current money-driven state of our legislative process, that this is a viable
way to address the matter.

21

Id.
Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 8, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/rethinking-judicial-selection/significant-figures. (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
23 Spitko, supra note 1, at 331.
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